Charles
Green arrived at Bramall Lane in September 1995 and was appointed as Chief
Executive by Manchester businessman Mike McDonald in February 1996, following
the latter's takeover of the club. With McDonald making a number of laudable
objectives to try and lift the Blades out of the doldrums; Green's job, as
McDonald's man on the ground, was to make it happen. Green's appointment and
involvement was sold as a positive thing for United. Presented as "a
football man" thanks to his involvement as a professional player until
injury ended his career and his focus switched to business.
What
actually occurred over the next three years was a turnaround of fortunes on the
pitch and the signing of relatively big name players for the Championship, but
the rug was pulled from under it all before any tangible success was achieved.
The
early days of Green's involvement saw Dave Bassett's reign as manager come to
an end. With supporter discontent high, yet a recognition of what Bassett had
achieved for the club, there were mixed emotions around Bramall Lane when
Bassett left by mutual consent. That should have been that, but an agreed
compensation package didn’t materialise as Bassett had expected and he later
stated that an attempt to argue his case with Green led to the latter offering
to sort it out in the car park, allegedly not the only time such managerial
tactics were employed.
Under
Bassett’s replacement, Howard Kendall, United went through a significant turnover
of players as funds were provided to increase the quality of the squad. As
United escaped relegation and the following season reached the play off final,
the club seemed to be on the up, despite the last minute play off final defeat
to Palace. However, little did the fans know the extent to which problems were
bubbling away beneath the surface. Problems derived from over ambition at board
level and some incredibly poor decision making by Green that would start to
unravel in the following 18 months and beyond.
United
continued to invest in well-known players; he return of former hero Brian Deane
was presented as a coup for the club. Dean Saunders was also signed. With Jan
Aage Fjortoft and Gareth Taylor already at the club, the Blades had an
embarrassment of riches in terms of attacking quality. However it had come at
an unsustainable price.
In
the summer of 1998 Steve Bruce was appointed manager and was reportedly
staggered at some of the salaries and contracts negotiated by Green. A fans
forum was told that Saunders and Deane together were being paid more than Dave
Bassett's entire squad of three years previous.
Deane
himself has talked of how he tried to temper negotiations so the club didn’t
end up with problems.
“I bought into what I
was being told by the Chief Executive at the time (Charles Green) as to what
they wanted to achieve at Sheffield United. I was really up for it. They even
offered me a two year contract and I said, “Look, I’ll sign a one year contract
and we will review it”.
I had been in the
Premier League with Leeds on Premier League wages, although nothing like what
they are today. It was a contract where I thought that if we aren’t promoted it
is going to be hard for the club to be able to afford it in this division. At
the time I was thinking that I really want to be here and if you’re telling me
that we are going to build a team that is capable of going up and then
competing in the Premier League, then I’m in for that. I’d seen Paul Merson go
up to Middlesbrough, he was still at the peak of his powers, so they obviously
had a plan and I wanted to do the same at United. “
Howard
Kendall returned to Everton and in a surprising move Nigel Spackman, on
United’s books as a player, was appointed as manager, his first managerial
role. This is when things started to unravel. Following Spackman's appointment
as manager Charles Green stated that the manager had signed a three year deal.
However, rumours persisted that Spackman hadn't actually signed it. A playing
contract remained in place, on more advantageous terms to the managerial
contract and so the latter remained unsigned. Green was increasingly seen as
untrustworthy by the fans.
Mounting
financial losses led to player departures, alongside long term injuries to key
players, this led to Spackman asking for funds for new players. Green's
response was to sell £2.5m of players, claiming that this wouldn't affect the
club's promotion prospects.
Fans
increasingly believed that Green was interfering in team affairs. The persistent
questioning on the matter was irritating Spackman and led to Mike McDonald issuing
a statement refuting the rumours and saying a three hour meeting had been held
to thrash out the issue. Maybe director involvement in team affairs is more
common now and wouldn’t cause as much fuss. It wasn’t that outwardly common
then and it was upsetting fans. It was as if Green believed his brief
involvement in the game as a player made him qualified to be involved in what
should be managerial duties. There are those who believe he had a say in
picking the team, although this has never been proved.
During
Green's reign as Chief Executive, several long-standing members of staff left
Bramall Lane; including the club physio, kit man and several backroom staff.
This built on rumours questioning who was managing these key team roles;
Spackman or Green. Departing players talked of increased director involvement
and team unrest as players were being "treated as pawns".
Green
told the press that Utrecht had enquired after popular striker Gareth Taylor,
to which Taylor responded that he knew nothing of it and was in the dark on the
whole situation. In the end, interviews given by Spackman and a FC Utrecht
spokesman suggested that a player would have to be leaving Bramall Lane,
whether it Taylor or another saleable asset. It was something Spackman admitted
he had little say over. Then Mike McDonald admitted that players would have to
be sold to stave off financial suicide.
His
argument was that the attendances were not high enough to support the squad
size and wage bill. He suggested that he had been led to believe that crowds
would increase with successful football and investment in the team, but it
hadn’t happened. That risk taking was, apparently, the fans fault. This “financial
suicide” that McDonald referred to was something he and Green had personally
presided over. To take the phrase used by the chairman of another Yorkshire
based club following their financial suicide, there was an element of them
"living the dream".
At
the end of the day McDonald was in it to make money and the decisions he and Green
had implemented were losing money on a weekly basis, albeit with on-pitch
success. Prior to buying United he had failed to achieve a takeover of his
beloved Manchester City and this was an alternative chance to “invest” in
football. He had even admitted United had been his choice, because they
represented a better opportunity to make money.
Eventually
things came to a head when Deane and Fjortoft were sold on the same day, with
manager Spackman not even aware of the deal. He was aware Fjortoft may be on
his way to Barnsley, but thought Deane was late for training until he spoke to
him on the phone and found he was in Lisbon, heading for talks with Benfica. It
was portrayed in the media as players wanting to leave, but Brian Deane recalls
differently;
“There is a lot about
leaving United that I still cannot get to the bottom of. There are some things
that I am still in the dark about. When I heard that I had wanted to leave, I
wondered where that came from. I never said that.”
Green
was becoming increasingly irascible. Apparently challenged by then director
(now majority shareholder) Kevin McCabe and others that they would be lynched
if Deane and Fjortoft were sold on the same day, Green's response was to say he
didn't give a damn and that he would sell Taylor as well. As further players
criticised the McDonald/Green regime, including Fjortoft, the only thing the
duo could do was resort to personal slurs. Fjortoft - scorer of 23 goals in 42
games was branded "lazy" and Fjortoft was quick to respond to with
both anger and an eagerness to expose further “lies” of Green and McDonald.
Spackman
eventually resigned shortly after this double blow of having his two best
strikers sold without his knowledge. The striking duo's departure had been
followed by the sale of Don Hutchison and the departure of Spackman's assistant
Willie Donachie, who left for Manchester City. His departure was followed by
more slurs from McDonald/Green; McDonald claiming Spackman’s appointment was
one he was never 100% happy with despite his public positivity when those
questioned his lack of experience at the time.
With
United challenging for promotion to the Premier League and on a decent FA Cup
run, fans could see the season unravelling. They had been sold a pup by
McDonald and Green yet they were the ones who were apparently to blame. Fans
chanted "Charles Green, he sells the team". They were right. He had
built a team with signings he had made, on wages the club couldn’t afford and
McDonald was unwilling to subsidise. In the end, under temporary manager Steve
Thompson, United lost in the play offs and in the cup semi-final. A season that
had promised much, had delivered some great games, but no end product.
"I am Chief
Executive. I take the decisons and I live by them" was Green’s retort
to criticism of his operations. In the end he died by them. His position
becoming increasingly untenable, in March 1998, Green's role was
"redefined" and moved away from team and management affairs; his
removal from the club impossible at the time due to pro-McDonald factions on
the board. His eventual resignation saw him receiving a payment in excess of
£100,000 an amount that caused consternation and raised questions when
highlighted by fans and shareholders at the AGM. He didn’t do badly for himself
out of a relatively unsuccessful spell at Bramall Lane.
In
between times new manager Steve Bruce had become increasingly vocal about the
difficulty of doing his job, players were targeted but not signed, and existing
players were sold. It was like managing with his hands tied behind his back. He
was paying the price for previous gambles that hadn’t been given the chance to
pay off. The plug pulled in panic. No-one can say whether United would have
reached the Premier League if Deane, Fjortoft, Hutchison and others hadn’t been
sold but, given the margins involved there must have been a good chance.
Charles
Green is a much vilified figure at Bramall Lane. He may have just been a puppet
for McDonald; he may have been the ultimate decision maker, guiding the
investor. Either way the manner by which he went about his business won him few
friends within the club, or with the fans.
Now,
after a significant absence, Green is back in football with Rangers. The fans
should treat his arrival with caution. What his role will be day-to-day remains
to be seen. But the last thing Rangers need now is a man who takes risks, a man
who panics when the risks don’t pay off and a man who fans doubt they can
trust.
If
you want to know more about Green’s time at United and the various boardroom
machinations over 30 years at a football club, I can recommend Fit & Proper:Conflicts & Conscience in an English Football Club. A real eye opening
book, whether you are a Blades fan or not. I am indebted to the book for
reminding me of the timeline and key events.
